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 OEDIPUS AND PERIANDER – A RECONSIDERATION 
 
In a classic article, ‘From Oedipus to Periander: lameness, tyranny, incest in legend 
and history’, published more than three decades ago in Arethusa,1 Jean-Pierre Vernant 
focuses on what he calls the ‘strange parallelism in the destiny of the Labdacids of 
legendary Thebes and of the Cypselids of historical Corinth’.2 The basic similarities 
in the infancy stories of Oedipus and Cypselus are well-known. Both are nearly killed 
shortly after their birth on the orders of people who, according to a prophecy, are 
doomed if the baby grows to manhood; yet in each case the killers shrink from the 
murder out of pity for the child, thereby allowing the prophecy to be fulfilled.3 
Oedipus and Cypselus’ son Periander are both involved in struggles within the family, 
in Periander’s case with his son, in Oedipus’ with his father; Vernant daringly 
assimilates the punishments that they both inflict as a result of these conflicts.4 Both 
Periander and Oedipus engage in deviant sexual behaviour.5 And both families are 
associated with lameness: Cypselos is the son of Labda, Oedipus the grandson of 
Labdacus, and both these names derive from the archaic letter lambda which had one 
                                               
I am most grateful to Professor Ewen Bowie for the invitation to contribute to this volume, and to Dr 
Almut Fries for helping me with a point in the translation of a German passage, below. 
1 Vernant (1982) = Buxton (2000) 109-29; on this topic see also Gentili (1986). 
2 Vernant (1982) 33 = Buxton (2000) 128. 
3 Ibid. 28-9 = 121-3. For the significance of pity in both stories – an issue not discussed by Vernant –
 see Finglass (forthcoming), introduction. 
4 Vernant (1982) 32 = Buxton (2000) 126: ‘Periander banishes his son, like a φαρμακός, to Corcyra, 
far from his eyes (ἐξ ὀφθαλμῶν μιν ἀποπέμπεται). The tyrant does not stab out his eyes in order to 
see no more, like Oedipus; he rejects his son so as to see him no more.’ 
5 In Periander’s case, his stripping of the women of Corinth (Hdt. 5.92.η.3), on which see Johnson 
(2001) 18-19. 
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‘leg’ shorter than the other.6 Labda in Herodotus is specifically said to be lame, and 
Oedipus’ ‘swollen feet’ as a result of their piercing when he was a baby must be an 
old feature of his story, built as it is into his very name.7 Vernant uses these 
connexions to argue that ‘in the Greek “imagination” the figure of the tyrant, as it is 
sketched out in the fifth and fourth centuries, adopts the features of the legendary 
hero, at once elect and cursed . . . Despising the rules which preside over the ordering 
of the social fabric . . . the tyrant . . . incarnates in his ambivalence the mythic figure 
of the lame man’.8 
Vernant shows little interest, however, in the instantiations of the myth in the 
literary works which, together with the pictorial record, provide our sources for 
ancient Greek mythology. He sometimes takes details crucial to his argument from 
texts centuries apart, without considering whether such an approach might be 
problematic;9 and although sometimes a later source preserves evidence for an earlier 
version, the possibility must always be considered that the detail in question results 
                                               
6 Robert (1915) I 59, Delcourt (1938) 110-11, (1944) 16-22, Jameson (1986) 4 = (2014) 187-8 (who 
notes that the upturned Boeotian lambda would not have the same symbolism, and thus that the name 
Labdakos cannot have a Theban origin; he suggests it may be Corinthian). 
7 Vernant’s view that Laius derives from λαίϝος ‘left’, and thus ‘crooked’ ((1982) 22-3 = Buxton 
(2000) 114), is however doubtful; the derivation from λάϝος ‘people’ (cf. Latin Publius) is more likely 
(thus Jameson (1986) 10 n. 34 = (2014) 196 n. 28). 
8 Vernant (1982) 33-4 = Buxton (2000) 128-9. 
9 See the criticisms of Lloyd-Jones (1985) 167-71 = (1991) 184-7, who points to e.g. the detail, 
discussed by Vernant (1982) 24 = Buxton (2000) 115-16, that the Sphinx is Laius’ illegitimate 
daughter, the earliest evidence for which Vernant cites is in Pausanias (9.26.3-5). 
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merely from later elaboration.10 There are exceptions to this tendency – Vernant 
emphasises, for example, that Periander’s sleeping with his mother is preserved in a 
later source and so cannot be considered part of Herodotus’ tale.11 But when dealing 
with the Oedipus myth in particular he culls details from many places without 
showing interest in any particular version, not even the most famous one, by 
Herodotus’ contemporary Sophocles, who is mentioned only once in the entire paper, 
and that in passing.12  
In this chapter I will be focusing not on some original or primary version of 
either myth, but on a more modest goal: on the presentation of the myth in Sophocles 
and Herodotus, and in particular on something that Vernant does not mention, the 
issuing of a solemn proclamation of excommunication by Oedipus and by Periander. 
This element of both stories shows remarkable similarities; equally there are crucial 
differences, and reflecting on these can help to bring out the authors’ distinct literary 
aims.13 
                                               
10 Cf. Bremmer (1987a) 42 ‘Historical and linguistic knowledge remains indispensable, even in a 
structuralist approach . . . In Greek mythology, . . . a chronological determination of the various motifs 
must . . . always be attempted.’ 
11 Vernant (1982) 29-30 = Buxton (2000) 123-4. The detail appears first in Diog. Laert. 1.96; see 
further Parth. Erot. Path. 17 with Lightfoot (1999) 484-6. 
12 Vernant (1982) 20 = Buxton (2000) 110-11. 
13 Cf. Saïd (2002) 127 ‘the dissimilarities [sc. between Oedipus and Cypselus] are as obvious as the 
similarities’. The earliest association of the proclamations known to me is that of Wesseling (1758) 221 
on Hdt. 3.51: ‘ceterum a Periandri edicto Oedipi verba ap. Sophoclem Oed. Tyr. v. 347 μητ’ 
εἰσδέχεσθαι, μήτε προσφωνεῖν τινα non abirent multum, ni uberiorem ea quae sequuntur, sanctionem 
conmplecterentur.’ More recent works that refer to it include Aly (1921) 95 = (1969) 95, Stern (1991) 
309-10, and Sourvinou-Inwood (1988) 176 n. 82 = (1991) 276-7 n. 82 (‘this similarity has not hitherto 
been placed, as I think it should, in the wider context of “father-son conflict”, the basic schema to 
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Sophocles’ Oedipus the King begins with a supplication of Oedipus by the 
people of his city, who are afflicted by a plague of mysterious origin. He learns from 
the Delphi oracle that to cure this disease, he must punish, by execution or 
banishment, the killers of the former king Laius. Prompted by that oracle, at the start 
of the second scene of the play he issues a formal proclamation setting out what the 
killer should do, and what the community should do if he does not. Below I quote the 
proclamation in full, one of the difficult speeches in tragic corpus; I provide my own 
text and translation, the justifications for which can be found in my forthcoming 
commentary on the play.14 
 
Οι.  αἰτεῖς· ἃ δ’ αἰτεῖς, τἄμ’ ἐὰν θέλῃς ἔπη   216 
κλύων δέχεσθαι τῇ νόσῳ θ’ ὑπηρετεῖν, 
ἀλκὴν λάβοις ἂν κἀνακούφισιν κακῶν· 
ἁγὼ ξένος μὲν τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐξερῶ, 
ξένος δὲ τοῦ πραχθέντος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μακρὰν   220 
ἴχνευον αὐτός, μὴ οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον. 
νῦν δ’, ὕστερος γὰρ ἀστὸς εἰς ἀστοὺς τελῶ, 
ὑμῖν προφωνῶ πᾶσι Καδμείοις τάδε· 
ὅστις ποθ’ ὑμῶν Λάϊον τὸν Λαβδάκου  
κάτοιδεν ἀνδρὸς ἐκ τίνος διώλετο,    225 
τοῦτον κελεύω πάντα σημαίνειν ἐμοί· 
κεἰ μὲν φοβεῖται τοὐπίκλημ’ ὑπεξελὼν 
<xqwqxqwqxqwq> 
αὐτὸς κατ’ αὐτοῦ· πείσεται γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν 
                                                                                                                                      
which both Oedipous’ and Lykophron’s stories belong’); Boedeker (2002) 112-14 examines the 
relationship between myth and history in Herodotus’ account. According to Gray (1996) 376, ‘the 
substitution of banishment for killing in the story of Lycophron represents that story’s own adaptation 
to the theme of revenge and the desolate household, because the heir must eventually be killed by the 
Corcyreans’; but this underplays how meaningful the theme of banishment turns out to be within 
Herodotus’ story. 
14 Finglass (forthcoming) ad loc.; also (2006) 260-1. 
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ἀστεργὲς οὐδέν, γῆς δ’ ἄπεισιν ἀβλαβής. 
εἰ δ’ αὖ τις ἄλλον οἶδεν ἐξ ἄλλης χθονὸς   230 
τὸν αὐτόχειρα, μὴ σιωπάτω· τὸ γὰρ 
κέρδος τελῶ ’γὼ χἠ χάρις προσκείσεται. 
εἰ δ’ αὖ σιωπήσεσθε, καί τις ἢ φίλου 
δείσας ἀπώσει τοὔπος ἢ χαὐτοῦ τόδε, 
ἃκ τῶνδε δράσω, ταῦτα χρὴ κλυεῖν ἐμοῦ.   235 
τὸν ἄνδρ’ ἀπαυδῶ τοῦτον, ὅστις ἐστί, γῆς 
τῆσδ’, ἧς ἐγὼ κράτη τε καὶ θρόνους νέμω, 
μήτ’ ἐσδέχεσθαι μήτε προσφωνεῖν τινά, 
μήτ’ ἐν θεῶν εὐχαῖσι μήτε θύμασιν 
κοινὸν ποεῖσθαι, μήτε χέρνιβος νέμειν·   240 
ὠθεῖν δ’ ἀπ’ οἴκων πάντας, ὡς μιάσματος 
τοῦδ’ ἡμὶν ὄντος, ὡς τὸ Πυθικὸν θεοῦ 
μαντεῖον ἐξέφηνεν ἀρτίως ἐμοί. 
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τοιόσδε τῷ τε δαίμονι 
τῷ τ’ ἀνδρὶ τῷ θανόντι σύμμαχος πέλω.   245 
[κατεύχομαι δὲ τὸν δεδρακότ’, εἴτε τις 
εἷς ὢν λέληθεν εἴτε πλειόνων μέτα, 
κακὸν κακῶς νιν ἄμοιρον ἐκτρῖψαι βίον. 
ἐπεύχομαι δ’, οἴκοισιν εἰ ξυνέστιος 
ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖς γένοιτ’ ἐμοῦ ξυνειδότος,    250 
παθεῖν ἅπερ τοῖσδ’ ἀρτίως ἠρασάμην.] 
ὑμῖν δὲ ταῦτα πάντ’ ἐπισκήπτω τελεῖν, 
ὑπέρ τ’ ἐμαυτοῦ, τοῦ θεοῦ τε, τῆσδέ τε 
γῆς ὧδ’ ἀκάρπως κἀθέως ἐφθαρμένης. 
οὐδ’ εἰ γὰρ ἦν τὸ πρᾶγμα μὴ θεήλατον,   255 
ἀκάθαρτον ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς ἦν οὕτως ἐᾶν 
ἀνδρός γ’ ἀριστέως βασιλέως τ’ ὀλωλότος, 
ἀλλ’ ἐξερευνᾶν· νῦν δ’ ἐπεὶ κυρῶ τ’ ἐγὼ 
ἔχων μὲν ἀρχάς, ἃς ἐκεῖνος εἶχε πρίν, 
ἔχων δὲ λέκτρα καὶ γυναῖχ’ ὁμόσπορον,   260 
κοινῶν τε παίδων κοίν’ ἄν, εἰ κείνῳ γένος 
μὴ ’δυστύχησεν, ἦν ἂν ἐκπεφυκότα – 
νῦν δ’ ἐς τὸ κείνου κρᾶτ’ ἐνήλαθ’ ἡ τύχη· 
ἀνθ’ ὧν ἐγὼ τάδ’ ὡσπερεὶ τοὐμοῦ πατρὸς  
ὑπερμαχοῦμαι κἀπὶ πάντ’ ἀφίξομαι    265 
ζητῶν τὸν αὐτόχειρα τοῦ φόνου λαβεῖν 
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τῷ Λαβδακείῳ παιδὶ Πολυδώρου τε καὶ 
τοῦ πρόσθε Κάδμου τοῦ πάλαι τ’ Ἀγήνορος. 
καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς μὴ δρῶσιν εὔχομαι θεοὺς 
μήτ’ ἄροτον αὐτοῖς γῆς ἀνιέναι τινὰ    270 
μήτ’ οὖν γυναικῶν παῖδας, ἀλλὰ τῷ πότμῳ 
τῷ νῦν φθερεῖσθαι κἄτι τοῦδ’ ἐχθίονι. 
ὑμῖν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοισι Καδμείοις, ὅσοις 
τάδ’ ἔστ’ ἀρέσκονθ’, ἥ τε σύμμαχος Δίκη 
χοἰ πάντες εὖ ξυνεῖεν εἰσαεὶ θεοί.    275 
 
You make a request. As for the nature of that request, if you are willing to receive my words 
as you hear them and to minister to the disease, you may acquire a defence against, and a 
relief from, your troubles. I will speak them as a stranger to this story, a stranger to the deed – 
for I would not be investigating far into the past on my own if I did not have some connexion. 
As it is, since at a later date I am enrolled as a citizen among citizens, this is what I proclaim 
to you, to all the Cadmaeans. Whosoever of you knows the man by whom Laius the son of 
Labdacus was killed, I order him to tell me the whole story. And if he is afraid that, removing 
the charge . . . himself against himself; for he will suffer nothing else unpleasant, but will 
depart from the land unharmed. But if anyone knows that the killer is a different person from 
a different land, let him not be silent; for I will pay the reward, and gratitude will be added to 
that. But if you are silent, and if anyone rejects these my words out of fear for a friend or for 
himself, you must hear me say what I will do as a consequence. As for this man, whoever he 
is, I forbid anyone from this land, whose authority and throne I hold, to receive him into his 
home or to address him, or to make him a fellow-participant in prayers to the gods or in 
sacrifices, or to give him his allotment of sacred water. Rather, I command everyone to drive 
him from their homes, since this man is the cause of our pollution, as the god’s Pythian oracle 
has just revealed to me. Such an ally am I for the god and for the dead man. [I pray that the 
perpetrator, whether he is a single person in hiding, or whether he did it as part of a larger 
group, will, as a wretch, wretchedly rub out his life, without his due portion. And I pray that if 
he were to share my hearth in my home with my knowledge, that I should suffer what I have 
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just prayed for these people.] I solemnly charge you to accomplish all these things, on my 
behalf, on behalf of the god, and on behalf of this land, which has wasted away, abandoned 
by crops and abandoned by the gods. For even if the affair had not been forced on us by 
divinity, it was not reasonable that you should have let the matter lie carelessly, unpurified 
when a man who was a noble and a king had been killed – no, you should have sought it out. 
As it is, since it has turned out that I possess the power that he held before, and possess his 
bed and the wife who shares our seed, and since a share in shared children, if offspring had 
not failed for him, would have been generated – but as it is, fate leaped onto that man’s head. 
Because of this, I will pursue this fight as if it were on behalf of my own father, and will go to 
every length as I seek to capture the perpetrator of the killing, on behalf of the son of 
Labdacus, the son of Polydorus, descendent of old Cadmus and of ancient Agenor. And for 
those who do not do these things, I pray that the gods do not produce any crops from their 
land, nor indeed children from their women, but rather that they will be destroyed by their 
present fate and by one even more hateful than this. But for you, the rest of the Cadmeians, 
for whom this things are pleasing, may Justice our ally and all the gods be with you always. 
 
A ruler’s proclamation cutting off an offender from human contact reappears in 
Herodotus’ account of Periander and his son Lycophron.15 Periander had beaten to 
death his wife Melissa, by whom he had had two sons, an elder, unnamed son, slow of 
intellect, and the younger, Lycophron. When their maternal grandfather, Procles of 
Epidaurus, was sending them back to their father after a visit to him, he asked if they 
knew who killed their mother. The elder son took no notice of the question, but the 
younger evidently concluded from it that Periander was responsible. So after his 
return to Corinth, Lycophron persistently refused to speak to his father, enraged. As a 
result Periander eventually drove him out of his house. On learning the cause of 
                                               
15 Hdt. 3.50-3. 
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Lycophron’s silence from his brother, Periander went further, sending a messenger to 
any people giving shelter to Lycophron to order them to desist. Lycophron 
consequently passed from one house to the next, until finally Periander issued a 
solemn proclamation excommunicating him from human society: 
 
ὁ Περίανδρος κήρυγμα ἐποιήσατο, ὃς ἂν ἢ οἰκίοισι ὑποδέξηταί μιν ἢ 
προσδιαλεχθῇ, ἱρὴν ζημίην τοῦτον τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι ὀφείλειν, ὅσην δὴ εἴπας. πρὸς 
ὦν δὴ τοῦτο τὸ κήρυγμα οὔτε τίς οἱ διαλέγεσθαι οὔτε οἰκίοισι δέκεσθαι ἤθελε· 
πρὸς δὲ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος ἐδικαίου πειρᾶσθαι ἀπειρημένου, ἀλλὰ διακαρτερέων 
ἐν τῇσι στοιῇσι ἐκαλινδέετο. 
 
Periander made a proclamation that whoever received him into his home or conversed 
with him would owe a penalty sacred to Apollo, stating the amount. So thanks to this 
proclamation nobody was willing to converse with him or to receive him into his 
house. Moreover, not even Lycophron himself thought it right to make the attempt, 
since he had been excommunicated, but he put up with rolling in the porticoes. 
Hdt. 3.52.1-2 
 
Periander now confronted his son, all but admitting his own guilt, and begging him to 
return; but Lycophron replied simply that he now owed a fine to Apollo. Realising 
that the cause was hopeless, the tyrant arranged for Lycophron to be taken to Corcyra, 
out of his sight. Years later, Periander attempted to persuade his son to return to 
Corinth to take over the tyranny from him; but first a messenger, and then the boy’s 
own sister failed to persuade him to return to his father’s presence. Eventually 
Periander proposed that Lycophron should come to Corinth and he, Periander, should 
depart for Corcyra; Lycophron agreed to this, but before the plan could be put into 
effect, the Corcyrans, not wanting to have Periander to deal with at close hand, 
murdered his son to prevent the swap. 
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Given the similarities between Oedipus and the Cypselid family identified by 
Vernant, the prominence of proclamations in both their stories is intriguing. Before 
we discuss them in more detail, however, it is well to emphasise that issuing decrees 
of excommunication was not merely the prerogative of long-dead kings, but 
something familiar in an Athenian civic context; I say ‘Athenian’ because that is the 
civic context about which we happen to be best informed, although nothing ties the 
process to any one Greek state in particular, and if we knew more about the internal 
politics of Sicyon or Corinth no doubt we would find references to it there too. The 
Athenian evidence, at least, goes back to at least the time of Draco:  
 
ἐν τοίνυν τοῖς περὶ τούτων νόμοις ὁ Δράκων φοβερὸν κατασκευάζων καὶ δεινὸν τό τιν’ 
αὐτόχειρα ἄλλον ἄλλου γίγνεσθαι, καὶ γράφων χέρνιβος εἴργεσθαι τὸν ἀνδροφόνον, 
σπονδῶν, κρατήρων, ἱερῶν, ἀγορᾶς, πάντα τἄλλα διελθὼν οἷς μάλιστ’ ἄν τινας ᾤετ’ 
ἐπισχεῖν τοῦ τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν, ὅμως οὐκ ἀφείλετο τὴν τοῦ δικαίου τάξιν, ἀλλ’ ἔθηκεν 
ἐφ’ οἷς ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτιννύναι, κἂν οὕτω τις δράσῃ, καθαρὸν διώρισεν εἶναι. 
 
Therefore in his laws concerning these things [sc. murders], Dracon, making it a fearful and 
terrible thing for one person to become the murderer of another, and writing that the murderer 
should be deprived of holy water, of libations, of mixing-bowls, of sacrifices, of the agora, 
and going through all the other things through which he thought that he would restrain people 
from doing anything of this sort, nevertheless did not take away due process, but established 
the conditions by which it was permitted to commit homicide, and if someone behaved in this 
way, he ordained that he would be pure. 
 
Dem. 20.15816 
 
                                               
16 On this passage see Kremmydas (2012) ad loc. 
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Such regulations were also in force in the fifth and fourth centuries, as the following 
selection of passages demonstrates: 
 
ἔτι δὲ παρελθὼν τὸν νόμον ὃν ὑμεῖς ἔθεσθε, εἴργεσθαι τῶν ἱερῶν αὐτὸν ὡς 
ἀλιτήριον ὄντα, ταῦτα πάντα βιασάμενος εἰσελήλυθεν ἡμῶν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, καὶ 
ἔθυσεν ἐπὶ τῶν βωμῶν ὧν οὐκ ἐξῆν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπήντα τοῖς ἱεροῖς περὶ ἃ 
ἠσέβησεν, εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸ Ἐλευσίνιον, ἐχερνίψατο ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς χέρνιβος. 
 
Still breaking the law which you established, that he should be deprived of sacrifices as being 
an offender, doing violence to all this he entered our city, and sacrificed on the altars which 
he was not permitted to do and he went to meet the sacrifices concerning which he had 
committed his impiety, came into the Eleusinion, washed himself with the holy water. 
 
Lys. 6.5217 
 
ἐὰν δέ τις τὸν ἀνδροφόνον κτείνῃ ἢ αἴτιος ᾖ φόνου, ἀπεχόμενον ἀγορᾶς ἐφορίας καὶ 
ἄθλων καὶ ἱερῶν Ἀμφικτυονικῶν, ὥσπερ τὸν Ἀθηναῖον κτείναντα, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς 
ἐνέχεσθαι, διαγιγνώσκειν δὲ τοὺς ἐφέτας. 
 
If someone kills a murderer or is responsible for his death, he should be kept away from the 
agora . . . and competitions and the Amphictyonic games, just as someone who killed an 
Athenian, and subject to the same penalties; the ephetai should make the decision. 
 
Dem. 23.37 = IG I3 104.26-9 18 
 
λαγχάνονται . . . καὶ αἱ τοῦ φόνου δίκαι πᾶσαι πρὸς τοῦτον, καὶ ὁ προαγορεύων 
εἴργεσθαι τῶν νομίμων οὗτός ἐστιν 
 
                                               
17 The asyndeton in the last line gives the description of the offence particular force. 
18 On this text see Canevaro (2013) 55-8. 
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Cases involving murder fall to the lot of this man [i.e. the archon basileus], and he is the 
person who proclaims excommunication from customary rites. 
 
[Arist.] Ath. Pol. 57.2 
 
κατελθὼν δὲ ὅ τι τοιοῦτον δράσας, τοῖς αὑτοῦ παισὶν ἱερῶν μὴ κοινωνείτω μηδὲ 
ὁμοτράπεζος γιγνέσθω ποτέ. 
 
When he returns after committing an act of this kind [i.e. when a spouse-killer returns from 
the designated period of exile], let him not share in sacrifices with his own children nor let 
him ever share a table with them. 
 
 Pl. Leg. 868e 
 
Excommunication could also be an informal sanction on the part of a community 
against offenders of various types – something that underlies this passage of 
Sophocles: 
 
ἄπολις ὅτῳ τὸ μὴ καλὸν      
ξύνεστι τόλμας χάριν.  
μήτ᾽ ἐμοὶ παρέστιος 
γένοιτο μήτ᾽ ἴσον φρονῶν 
ὃς τάδ᾽ ἔρδοι.        
 
Citiless is the man who consorts with what is not noble thanks to his boldness. Let 
that man never share my hearth or share my thoughts, whoever should do such 
things! 
Soph. Ant. 370/1-375 
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Such passages might be more closely connected with civic acts of excommunication 
than at first appears; as Parker argues, ‘there are historical instances of public 
malefactors being subjected to what appears at first sight to be a spontaneous social 
ostracism, but could be a survival of a more formal earlier institution’.19 
Nor is Oedipus the King the only tragedy which makes use of a formal 
excommunication. We also find one in Euripides’ Orestes, where Orestes, Pylades, 
and Electra are deprived of human contact ahead of the trial that will determine their 
fate, as described in these passages, the former spoken by Orestes, the latter by 
Tyndareus:20 
 
ἔδοξε δ’ Ἄργει τῷδε μήθ’ ἡμᾶς στέγαις, 
μὴ πυρὶ δέχεσθαι, μηδὲ προσφωνεῖν τινα 
μητροκτονοῦντας· κυρία δ’ ἥδ’ ἡμέρα 
ἐν ᾗ διοίσει ψῆφον Ἀργείων πόλις, 
εἰ χρὴ θανεῖν νὼ λευσίμῳ πετρώματι. 
 
It was decided by this land of Argos that no-one should receive us under his roof or at 
his hearth, and that no-one should speak to us, since we are matricides; this is the 
appointed day on which the city of the Argives will cast its vote on whether we must 
die by stoning. 
 
Eur. Or. 46-50 
 
καλῶς ἔθεντο ταῦτα πατέρες οἱ πάλαι· 
ἐς ὀμμάτων μὲν ὄψιν οὐκ εἴων περᾶν 
οὐδ’ εἰς ἀπάντημ’ ὅστις αἷμ’ ἔχων κυροῖ, 
φυγαῖσι δ’ ὁσιοῦν, ἀνταποκτείνειν δὲ μή.  
 
                                               
19 Thus Parker (1983) 194 citing, in n. 17, Hdt. 7.231, Lys. 13.79, and other texts. 
20 For these passages see Melis (2015), who sets them in the judicial context described above. 
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Our fathers establised these things well. Whoever had the taint of blood, they did not 
allow him to come into people’s sight or to encounter anyone, but they restored purity 
by exile, but did not allow them to be killed  
Ibid. 512-15 
 
The Orestes excommunication takes place in a democratic context – indeed, it is 
presented as the result of a vote by the Argives as a whole, and thus formally more 
democratic than the Athenian instances cited above, where such proclamations are 
usually pronounced by a magistrate acting on the people’s behalf. 
The passages just cited indicate that the very act of issuing such a 
proclamation is not in itself tyrannical or overbearing – rather, it was a feature 
familiar to Greeks of this period. The next question is how the proclamations by 
Oedipus and Periander put this feature to use. In their treatments it is not hard to 
observe prominent similiarities. In both cases the proclamation is issued by an all-
powerful ruler; in both cases it is aimed at cutting off an offender from all human 
intercourse. The offence that has given rise to the proclamation in both cases derives 
from an act of violence within the family, and in particular a son’s defiance of his 
father. The proclamation in both cases rebounds onto the proclaimer, who breaks the 
very proclamation that he had so publicly pronounced; he thereby causing himself to 
be subject to its penalties, in each case a penalty owed to Apollo.21 And in both cases 
the proclaimer unwittingly causes the death of a close family member. 
Let us leave, for the moment, the question of whether either Herodotus or 
Sophocles was aware of the other’s work. For now, let us examine the two 
                                               
21 ‘This must be connected with Apollo’s function as the god concerned with pollution par excellence’ 
(Sourvinou-Inwood (1988) 176 n. 84 = (1991) 277 n. 84). 
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proclamations in greater detail, to tease out the differences between these formally 
similar acts and thus better to appreciate the functions that they play within their 
respective narratives. 
First, although both proclamations have their origins in violence within the 
family, only one proclaimer knows this at the time that the proclamation is delivered. 
Periander is well aware of the offence that he has committed, having killed his wife, 
and knows that his proclamation is targeted against his own son. Oedipus, by contrast, 
regards himself as ‘a stranger to this story, a stranger to the deed’, entirely unaware 
both that he is making a proclamation against himself as the killer of Laius, and that 
Laius was his own father. This reflects a central theme of Sophocles’ play, one not so 
important in Herodotus’ account of Periander – the frailty of human knowledge. 
Herodotus, by contrast, focuses on the abuse of power represented by Periander’s 
proclamation – a subject central to the portrayal of tyrants throughout his history. 
Second, the scope and limits of the two proclamations are different. 
Periander’s is apparently aimed at the whole of Greece; certainly, there is no 
indication that Lycophron can escape his father’s antagonism merely by going into 
exile. In this respect the proclamation demonstrates a tyrant’s typical overreach. 
Moreover, it follows a repeated set of interventions whereby Periander orders private 
citizens not to receive Lycophron into their homes, thereby interfering with their 
rights as householders;22 and these in turn came after the original harsh punishment 
meted out to his son, expulsion from the family home. Oedipus, by contrast, allows 
the killer to go into exile unharmed after incriminating himself, a course which makes 
a confession more likely and displays his own merciful character. He also carefully 
                                               
22 Such behaviour recalls that of Eurystheus before the actions of Euripides’ Children of Heracles, who 
threatens with the might of Argos each of the cities with which they take refuge (17-25). 
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specifies that his proclamation applies to the territory within his jurisdiction, thereby 
acknowledging the limits of his authority. He moreover asserts his right to make the 
proclamation on the basis of his adopted Theban citizenship, as someone ‘enrolled as 
a citizen among citizens’, where the polyptoton emphasises his status as one among 
many, rather than as a ruler with unique authority. He does possess such authority, as 
the Prologue demonstrated, and in effect his proclamation shows him exercising it, 
since no ordinary citizen could make a speech like that and expect people to listen; 
but tactfully he does not press that point. 
In this respect we may also contrast the parallel passages cited above, where 
excommunication features as a means of isolating people suspected of heinous crimes 
before they are brought to trial; if convicted, they will suffer the ultimate 
excommunication, death. In the case of Periander’s proclamation, the target has 
committed no offence, so the isolation of a criminal is not at issue. In Oedipus’ 
speech, excommuncation applies to the killer only if he fails to come forward, and, 
although that penalty is depicted in serious terms, there is no capping reference to any 
prospect of execution. This difference is partly because there is no prospect of a trial, 
either; such formal judicial apparatus does not feature within the world of this play. 
But it is also because Oedipus is being as mild as he is determined in his pursuit of the 
offender; his passionate desire to discover Laius’ killer is based on his love for the 
city and his consequent wish to fulfil the instructions of the oracle, rather than on any 
personal lust for vengeance. 
This point is worth highlighting since Vernant places considerable emphasis 
on how Oedipus and Periander are both associated with the connected ideas of 
lameness and tyranny. Yet the proclamations that the two men utter, through their 
different styles, rather emphasise different approaches to rulership. Oedipus’ 
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behaviour stands as far away from that of the typical tyrant as it is possible to be; 
Periander’s proclamation, on the other hand, is the culmination of a series of 
unmerited attacks on the liberty of his son and those who want to help him. As far as 
the portrayal of Oedipus in Sophocles’ play goes, then, Vernant’s article could 
scarcely be less applicable. 
This leads naturally to the third difference, the justification for the 
excommunication. As we have seen from the proclamations from other texts cited 
above, excommunication was a punishment applied to people suspected of great 
crimes – usually, indeed ahead of a trial – because of the danger that if the person has 
indeed committed the crime of which he is suspected, he could pollute others by mere 
association, especially in religious contexts that demanded purity of their participants. 
Oedipus’ proclamation suits that context well, even if an eventual trial is not 
envisaged; its target is not just a killer, but the killer of a king, who has spurned 
Oedipus’ offer of an easy exile. In Periander’s case, by contrast, there is no possibility 
that the target of the proclamation, Lycophoron, could pollute anyone else. Indeed, 
the polluter in this story is the proclaimer; and the proclamation is aimed not at a 
polluter, but at the only person in Corinth who seems to have discovered the polluter’s 
guilt. In the words of Sourvinou-Inwood, ‘Lykophron is treated as though he had 
killed Periander’,23 when if anything it should be Lycophron who delivers a 
proclamation against Periander for the killing of his mother. Sourvinou-Inwood 
nevertheless goes on to try to fit the events described by Herodotus into the expected 
schema whereby the object of the proclamation is indeed the offender, arguing that in 
Lycophron’s case, ‘“turning against the father” is symbolically closely related to 
“killing the father”’ (p. 177 = p. 260). This misses the irony that the usual roles of 
                                               
23 Sourvinou-Inwood (1988) 177 = (1991) 260. 
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guilt and innocence are knowingly reversed, with Periander showing the tyrant’s 
capacity to pervert the institutions of justice as well as normal human relationships. 
The irony in Sophocles’ play, by contrast, is of a different order – there too the 
proclaimer is the polluter, but the proclaimer is tragically unaware of that fact. 
Fourth, the breaking of the proclamation by the man who delivers it takes a 
significantly different form in each account. Oedipus breaks it out of ignorance, as he 
later remarks;24 again, this befits a tragedy built around the theme of the limitations of 
human knowledge. Periander breaks it out of desperation, but nevertheless knowingly. 
He thereby demonstrates the inconsistency of the tyrant – something anticipated by 
those people who, before the excommunication, gave shelter to Lycophron despite 
knowing of his quarrel with his father, because he was nevertheless his father’s son.25 
Fifth, these excommunications by proclamation are not the only ones in either 
story. Both Sophocles’ play and Herodotus’ Periander-logos contain two voluntary 
acts of excommunication. In the former, Oedipus as it were excommunicates himself 
from what he believes to be his homeland, Corinth, when he is told by the Delphic 
oracle that he is destined to kill his father and marry his mother: 
 
λάθρᾳ δὲ μητρὸς καὶ πατρὸς πορεύομαι 
Πυθώδε, καί μ’ ὁ Φοῖβος ὧν μὲν ἱκόμην 
ἄτιμον ἐξέπεμψεν, ἄλλα δ’ ἀθλίῳ 
καὶ δεινὰ καὶ δύστηνα προὐφάνη λέγων,  790 
                                               
24 Soph. OR 744-5 οἴμοι τάλας· ἔοικ’ ἐμαυτὸν εἰς ἀρὰς | δεινὰς προβάλλων ἀρτίως οὐκ εἰδέναι 
(‘Oimoi, I am wretched! I seem just now to have unwittingly cast myself amid dreadful curses’). 
25 Compare how the servants of Cambyses, ordered by the king to kill a friend of his, do not carry out 
the order because they anticipate that he will change his mind; when eventually he does so he is 
delighted that his friend is alive, but nevertheless executes the servants who disobeyed him (Hdt. 
3.36.4-6). 
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ὡς μητρὶ μὲν χρείη με μειχθῆναι, γένος δ’ 
ἄτλητον ἀνθρώποισι δηλώσοιμ’ ὁρᾶν, 
φονεὺς δ’ ἐσοίμην τοῦ φυτεύσαντος πατρός. 
κἀγὼ ’πακούσας ταῦτα τὴν Κορινθίαν 
ἄστροις τὸ λοιπὸν τεκμαρούμενος χθόνα  795 
ἔφευγον, ἔνθα μήποτ’ ὀψοίμην κακῶν 
χρησμῶν ὀνείδη τῶν ἐμῶν τελούμενα. 
 
In secret from my mother and father I travelled to Pytho, and Phoebus sent me away 
without honouring the purpose for which I had come, but rather he was manifest in 
speaking other dire, terrible, words to me in my wretchedness, that it was fated that I 
should have intercourse with my mother, and display an unbearable progeny for 
mortals to see, and that I would be the murderer of the man who fathered me. And I, 
on hearing this, went into exile, intending henceforth to infer the position of the land 
of Corinth by the stars, to a place where I would never see the reproaches of the 
terrible oracles come true. 
Soph. OR 787-97 
 
In this case, Oedipus knowingly excommunicates himself, departing from his 
homeland for good; he later remarks on the pain that this involves.26 This 
excommunication too is based on ignorance; ignorant of who his parents truly are, 
and therefore of his true homeland, he excommunicates himself from the land into 
which he was originally ‘excommunicated’ as a baby, thereby achieving the exact 
opposite of his intentions.  
The additional excommunication in Herodotus’ tale involves Lycophron by 
his silence as it were excommunicating Periander himself. The formal 
                                               
26 Soph. OR 997-9 ὧν οὕνεχ’ ἡ Κόρινθος ἐξ ἐμοῦ πάλαι | μακρὰν ἀπῳκεῖτ’· εὐτυχῶς μέν, ἀλλ’ 
ὅμως | τὰ τῶν τεκόντων ὄμμαθ’ ἥδιστον βλέπειν.  ‘Because of this, Corinth for a long time has 
been kept far separate from me. It was for a good end, but nevertheless it is most pleasant to look upon 
the eyes of one’s parents.’ 
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excommunication in that story punishes a guiltless party; but that is merely a response 
to the informal excommuncation, achieved without any formal proclamation on 
Lycophron’s part, and yet which proves far more effective and durable that the 
excommunication effected by Periander. For whereas Periander goes on to break the 
excommunication that he has ordained by going to plead with his son, Lycophron 
remains implacable, merely pointing out to him the penalty that his speech has 
automatically incurred; he maintains his own, informal excommuncation of his father 
to the last. The double excommunication in Sophocles emphasises the ignorance of 
the protagonist; in Herodotus, by contrast, it highlights the paradoxical weakness of 
the almighty tyrant. 
All these differences allow a better appreciation of what Sophocles and 
Herodotus are trying to achieve in their respective tales; Vernant’s influential paper 
had emphasised only what they had in common, but the divergences too have their 
significance. But one similarity remains that has not so not far been remarked on: the 
essentially tragic nature of both stories. Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus was of course 
seen as a paradigmatic tragedy even in antiquity. Calling the story of Periander a 
tragedy requires more justification, in that he brings his doom upon himself through 
his own tyrannical behaviour, in particular the killing of his wife and the persecution 
of his son. Yet even so he remains a wretched, even sympathetic figure, as his 
exchange with his son demonstrates:27 
 
τετάρτῃ δὲ ἡμέρῃ ἰδών μιν ὁ Περίανδρος ἀλουσίῃσί τε καὶ ἀσιτίῃσι 
συμπεπτωκότα οἴκτιρε· ὑπεὶς δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς ἤιε ἆσσον καὶ ἔλεγε “ὦ παῖ, κότερα 
τούτων αἱρετώτερά ἐστι, ταῦτα τὰ νῦν ἔχων πρήσσεις, ἢ τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὰ 
ἀγαθὰ τὰ νῦν ἐγὼ ἔχω, ταῦτα ἐόντα τῷ πατρὶ ἐπιτήδεον παραλαμβάνειν; ὃς 
                                               
27 Hdt. 3.52.3-5. 
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ἐὼν ἐμός τε παῖς καὶ Κορίνθου τῆς εὐδαίμονος βασιλεὺς ἀλήτην βίον εἵλευ, 
ἀντιστατέων τε καὶ ὀργῇ χρεώμενος ἐς τόν σε ἥκιστα ἐχρῆν. εἰ γάρ τις συμφορὴ 
ἐν αὐτοῖσι γέγονε, ἐξ ἧς ὑποψίην ἐς ἐμὲ ἔχεις, ἐμοί τε αὕτη γέγονε καὶ ἐγὼ αὐτῆς 
τὸ πλεῦν μέτοχος εἰμί, ὅσῳ αὐτός σφεα ἐξεργασάμην. σὺ δὲ μαθὼν ὅσῳ 
φθονέεσθαι κρέσσον ἐστὶ ἢ οἰκτίρεσθαι, ἅμα τε ὁκοῖόν τι ἐς τοὺς τοκέας καὶ ἐς 
τοὺς κρέσσονας τεθυμῶσθαι, ἄπιθι ἐς τὰ οἰκία.” 
 
Seeing him on the fourth day fallen amid filth and hunger Periander had pity on him. 
Departing from his anger, he came closer to him and said ‘My son, which of these is 
preferable, doing what you are doing now, or to inherit the monarchy and good things 
that I now have by being accommodating to your father, you who although you are 
my son and a prince of wealthy Corinth have chosen the life of a beggar, keeping 
your distance and indulging in anger against the person whom you ought not to most 
of all. For if any misfortune in such matters has occurred from which you have 
suspicion against me, the same has happened to me and I am a sharer in it to a greater 
extent, to the degree that I myself actually carried out the deeds. But you learn how 
much better it is to be envied than to be pitied, and at the same time what a thing it is 
to be angry against your parents and those more powerful than you, and come back 
home.’ 
 
Periander’s words are to an extent tendentious; such emphasis on the family bond on 
father and son (especially ‘indulging in anger against the person whom you ought not 
to most of all’) hardly suits a man who had killed his own wife, the mother of that 
son. Moreover, his admission of responsibility is half-hearted; and the final words 
‘what a thing it is to be angry against your parents and those more powerful than you’ 
contain a not-so-veiled threat by reminding Lycophron of his power. The reference to 
envy being preferable to pity, itself a commonplace,28 is out of place in a speech that 
shows the unenviable consequences of a tyrant’s actions. Nevertheless, these are 
                                               
28 Cf. Pind. P. 1.85. 
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moving words that show that even a tyrant can be affected by pity (something 
confirmed by the narrator), and demonstrate the impact of Periander’s actions on the 
man himself. And although the reader or listener may understand why, despite this 
speech, Lycophron still refuses to address his father, or rather answers him with a curt 
response worse than silence, that response may nevertheless create some pity in 
Herodotus’ readers even for Periander. His subsequent decision to hand control of his 
empire to his son, willingness to exchange Corinth for Corcyra to secure the transition 
of power, and vengeance on the Corcyreans for compassing Lycophron’s death all 
testify, in their way, to a father’s paternal devotion. Herodotus has so constructed his 
tale that it is hard not to feel any sympathy for the catastrophes that envelop 
Periander, even though they are ultimately caused by his own wrongheadedness, and 
as a result the adjective tragic would not be misapplied. 
The Oedipus story is not the only relevant tragic comparandum for Herodotus’ 
account of Periander. It recalls also the relationship between Clytemnestra and Electra 
in Sophocles’ Electra, a play probably from after his Oedipus the King and almost 
certainly from after the lifetime of Herodotus.29 As in Herodotus, a child declines a 
life of luxury through refusal to come to any accommodation with a parent who had 
killed their other parent; as in Herodotus, the defiant behaviour of that child is 
contrasted with that of a more accommodating sibling of the same gender. In Electra 
there is no question of a proclamation banning anyone from associating with Electra, 
since she remains in front of her house to torture her father’s killers with her cries; but 
                                               
29 For the association with Sophocles’ Electra see Saïd (2002) 127, Griffin (2006) 49, and also Aly 
(1921) 94 = (1969) 94 who associates it with that related drama, Shakespeare’s Hamlet; for the date of 
Sophocles’ play see Finglass (2007) 1-4, (2011) 1-6. 
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the possibility is raised that, if she does not desist, she will be buried alive 
underground, a fate that she purports to welcome (372-91). 
In the case of Electra there is no question that Herodotus was influenced by 
Sophocles; but what about for Oedipus the King? The question was discussed nearly a 
century ago by Wolf Aly: 
 
Für Hdt legt der Bann, den König Oidipus über den unbekannten Mörder ausspricht 
(V. 236ff.) die Vermutung nahe, daß der Sohn den Vater wie einen gebannten Mörder 
behandelt, sodaß der Bann des Vaters nur die Antwort auf dies Benehmen wäre. Das 
führt auf B [a stage defined on pp. 93-4 as ‘Der Vater ächtet seinen Sohn ob seines 
Schweigens und wird, da er ihn voll Mitleid anspricht, von seinem eigenen Bann 
getroffen’], wo dieser in seinem eigenen Wort gefangen wird. So verflucht sich 
unwissend Oidipus selbst (V. 350). Das Motiv ist von Sophokles in die Oidipussage 
eingeführt, daß es Hdt von Sophokles habe, ist chronologisch sogut wie unmöglich. 
Eher ist das Umgekehrte der Fall, wie ja der König Oidipus auch sonst die 
Bekanntschaft mit Hdt’s Werk zeigt. So wird auch verständlich, daß das Motiv bei 
Hdt viel nebensächlicher behandelt ist als in der Tragödie, wo es in den Mittelpunkt 
der Katastrophe gestellt ist. 
 
For Herodotus the exclusion order that King Oedipus delivers in the case of the 
unknown murderer suggests that the son treats his father like an banished murderer, 
so that the father’ ban would only be the answer to this behaviour. This leads to the 
stage whereby the father respects his son because of his silence and, because he 
addresses him full of pity, is penalised by his own exclusion order – a stage where 
this man is caught by his own words. In this way Oedipus himself unknowingly 
curses himself. The theme is introduced by Sophocles into the Oedipus saga; that 
Herodotus took it from Sophocles is chronologically as good as impossible. Rather 
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the reverse is the case, as indeed Oedipus the King shows familiarity with Herodotus’ 
work in other ways too. So it is also understandable that the motif is handled in 
Herodotus in a very insignificant manner compared to what is in the tragedy, where it 
is placed in the central point of the catastrophe. 
Aly (1921) 95 ≈ (1969) 95 
 
In the light of the discussion in this chapter we may question whether the role of the 
proclamation in Herodotus is really ‘very insignificant’; it is less of a set piece than in 
Sophocles, to be sure, but both texts use their proclamations to bring out key themes 
in their respective stories and to emphasise the essentially tragic nature of the tales. 
As for the chronology, the last dated events in Herodotus are from 431 and 430;30 he 
cannot have died before the early 420s at the earliest. On the other hand, the most 
likely period of time for the first performance of Sophocles’ play is between c. 440 
and 420.31 It is not impossible that Sophocles’ play came before Herodotus’ casting of 
the Periander story. A connexion between Sophocles’ Antigone, from perhaps c. 
450,32 in which Antigone expresses the view that she would die for a brother, but not 
for a husband or for a son, and the passage of Herodotus, in which Intaphernes’ wife 
pleads for the life of her brother rather than that of her husband or son, has long been 
accepted.33 It is generally agreed that the direction of influence was from Herodotus 
to Sophocles, since the motif fits more organically in the former’s story; indeed, 
several scholars have wanted to excise it from Sophocles altogether, in my view 
without justification. In her discussion of the passages Stephanie West concludes: 
                                               
30 Hdt. 6.91, 7.137, 7.233.2, 9.73; cf. Stadter (2012) 42 with n. 14. 
31 See Finglass (forthcoming), introduction. 
32 See Finglass (2011) 1-11. 
33 Soph. Ant. 904-20; Hdt. 3.119. 
 24 
 
Herodotus’ work has made a notably favourable impression at Athens in the 440s, 
and though, even if Herodotus repeated his lectures to many different groups, only a 
small proportion of Sophocles’ audience can have heard him, the content of his 
lectures may well for a time have been the talk of the town. Though we should not 
look for subtle effects of intertextuality, it is not unreasonable to suppose that 
Sophocles expected some members of his audience to be reminded of Herodotus’ 
account of Persian affairs under Cambyses and Darius.34  
 
At the end of his career Sophocles had Oedipus make a striking reference to how 
Greek customs regarding the behaviour of men and women were reversed by the 
Egyptians – a reversal which also happen to be central to Herodotus’ account of that 
people.35 In that last case, at least, there can be no question of Sophocles’ coming 
first. 
Such connexions suggest that it is far from impossible that one author could 
have been influenced by the other in their telling of the tales. But whether we need to 
draw that conclusion, whether the similarities are so great in this case that only direct 
influence could explain them, is open to question. In discussing Herodotus’ account 
of Periander we might, as Moles does, refer to a ‘specifically tragic intermyth with the 
story of Oedipus’,36 but not necessarily with the version of that myth as told by 
Sophocles. The ultimately self-destructive use of a proclamation of excommunication 
is the kind of literary device that could easily have occurred independently to different 
authors, allowing them as it does to highlight the ignorance of one character and the 
                                               
34 West (1999) 112; see further ibid. 110-12. 
35 OC 337-45, from a play first performed in 401 after Sophocles’ death in 405; Hdt. 2.35.2-4. 
36 Moles (2007) 248. 
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irrational excess of the other. That in itself is justification enough for studying the two 
treatments in parallel. Nevertheless, we cannot quite rule out the possibility that 
Herodotus gave his friend Sophocles a tip, or even that Herodotus himself, in the 
audience at that first performance of Oedipus the King, received the inspiration there 
for his presentation of Periander. 
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